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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL








The threat of environmental disasters of global proportions,
i.e., those catastrophes which spread beyond the territorial
boundary of a state, or which are beyond the economic means of
a single state to manage, is ubiquitous.' Concomitant with the
pervasive transport of oil is the impending possibility of oil
spills. 2 The continued use of nuclear fuel to power reactors and
t J.D., St. John's University School of Law; LL.M. in Environmental Law, Pace
University School of Law; sole practitioner in Tarrytown, New York.
Environmental disasters of global proportions, of necessity, are loosely defined.
They are, however, confined to those disasters with environmental consequences, as op-
posed to those with only humanitarian implications, notwithstanding the ineluctable
human consequences of environmental degradation of any magnitude.
2 Most existing treaties dealing with international disasters deal with oil spills. The
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation,
("OPRC") defines an "Oil Pollution Incident" as "an occurrence or series of occurrences
having the same origin, which results or may result in a discharge of oil and which poses
or may pose a threat to the marine environment, or to the coastline or related interests
of one or more States, and which requires emergency action or other immediate re-
sponse." International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-op-
eration, Nov. 30, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733, 737 (1991) [hereinafter OPRC].
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manufacture weapons provides an enduring specter of accidental
releases of radiation with its devastating impact on health and
the environment.' The environment has also been exposed to the
dramatic results of the intentional infliction of pollution as a
means of prosecuting warfare in the Persian Gulf.4 Looming om-
inously are the ramifications of the emission of air pollutants,
implicated in both global climate changes 5 and depletion of the
earth's protective ozone layer.6
These "major international hazards,"' by their nature, tran-
scend national boundaries and political interests.8 The costs of
response and remedy are expensive even when the necessary re-
sources can be amassed to handle the problem.9 The upshot of
these threats, and of our increasing current awareness of the
consequences of continuing pollution on a global level, mandate
' Despite the claim of environmentalists that "Chernobyl drove a stake through the
heart of nuclear power, at least in Western Europe, . . . France has opened 13 nuclear
reactors since Chernobyl . . .and it is laying plans to build plants in Hungary to supply
customers in Germany and Italy." L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1991, at 7.
' The Gulf War resulted, inter alia, in an oil slick estimated at one million barrels.
28 UN CHRON., June 1991, at 16.
1 Some scientists see a linkage between global warming and the "unusually severe
flooding - two feet higher than ever previously recorded" which ravaged Bangladesh
following the May 1, 1991 typhoon. John Horgan, Burning Questions: Scientists Launch
Studies of Kuwait's Oil Fires, 265 Sci. AM., July 1991, at 17.
6 Industrial gases, notably chlorfluorocarbons (CFCs), threaten to deplete the
planet's protective ozone shield to such an extent that the number of human and animal
cancers would rise sharply and the ocean's food chain would be disrupted. THE WORLD
COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 33 (1987) [here-
inafter OUR COMMON FUTURE].
I A cogent definition of the "major" aspect of "major international hazard" has been
posited as substantial environmental injury,
affecting the life-support system immediately or in the foreseeable future. This
impact may be (i) global, such as threatened ozone depletion or climate modifica-
tion; (ii) regional, having a more limited geographic effect, such as transnational
acid rain or pollution of an international river; or (iii) species or resource specific,
such as extinction of an endangered species or depletion of an essential local
resource.
Nicholas A. Robinson, Introduction: Emerging International Environmental Law, 17
STAN. J. INT'L L. 229, 244-45 (1981).
1 Eduard Schevardnadse, then Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, proposed a
concept which he termed "politecology" as a combination of politics, economics and eco-
logical security to fulfill the task of environmental protection. Eduard A. Schevardnadse,
Ecology and Diplomacy, 20 ENVT'L POL'Y & L. 20 (1990).
' The cost of the Exxon Valdez clean-up in Prince William Sound, Alaska has been
estimated at $15 billion. NEWSDAY, Oct. 19, 1991, at 16.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/9
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a global response.
The concept of a "green cross"'" to respond with immediate
assistance in difficult environmental emergencies, is not a new
one, but is an idea which gained tremendous momentum in the
aftermath of the Gulf War. 1'
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),'2
headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, has decided to establish an
experimental center for urgent environmental assistance."s
Part I of this article presents further justification for the
continued existence of a global response entity (GRE), such as
the U.N. Center, to respond to environmental disasters of global
'o One proponent of the "green cross" concept was then Soviet Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Vladimir F. Petrovsky, who "suggested the creation of a 'green cross' center for
emergency environmental assistance" in front of the United Nations General Assembly
on October 5, 1989. Paul Lewis, Greater U.N. Role Urged by Soviets, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
1989, at A20, col. 1.
I1 At an international conference in June 1991, on the use of the environment as a
tool of war, held in Ottawa, Canada, the idea of a "green cross" which "would respond to
environmental accidents and acts of [environmental] terrorism the way the International
Red Cross responds to human misery" was proposed. Tim Harper, Support Growing for
Environmental Response Team, TORONTO STAR, July 13, 1991, at A19.
12 UNEP is an outgrowth of the 1972 United Nations Convention on the Human
Environment (Stockholm Conference) which produced a Declaration on the Human En-
vironment, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 and Corr. (1972) [hereinafter The Stockholm Declaration] the
Action Plan of which called for implementation by an international environmental man-
agement body, which was established by the General Assembly as UNEP. Mark Allan
Gray, The United Nations Environment Programme: An Assessment, 20 ENVT'L L. 291,
293-94 (1990).
" The U.N. Center for Urgent Environmental Assistance (U.N. Center) will operate
for an 18-month trial period commencing in 1992. As proposed, the center will "be used
at the request of governments to help them cope with environmental disasters such as
the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident and the effects from the war in the Persian Gulf
region." UNEP Governing Council Agrees to Expand Units Handling Industry, Envi-
ronmental Law, INrr'L ENv'T REP. (BNA), June 5, 1991. During its trial-period, the U.N.
Center will be staffed by young volunteers, creating a roster of experts and a listing of
emergency equipment. Id. Among the other proposals which UNEP was considering
were:
"creation of a high-level Ecological Security Council within the U.N. system[;] de-
velopment of a centre to provide urgent assistance in environmental emergen-
cies[;] adoption of a code of environmental conduct[;] greater use of satellites or
space laboratory stations to monitor the environment[;] [and] a system of arbitra-
tion on international environment disputes and an insurance scheme backed by
state guarantees governing ecological damage, liability and compensation."
Rory Channing, Environmentalists Eye Disarmament Savings, "Green Bonds", REUTER
LIBR. REP., May 16, 1989.
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proportions; Part II examines the framework of existing models
for such an entity; and Part III proposes both a legal framework
as well as a mission for that entity.
I. THE GLOBAL RESPONSE ENTITY (GRE)
A. Justification: Environmental Disasters
The environmental disasters encountered in the last decade
alone provide adequate justification for an institution to amass
global resources and elicit universal cooperation in combating
potential crises. The most compelling reason for a global re-
sponse entity (GRE) to respond to these crises is the inter-rela-
tionship between the emission of pollutants in one region of the
world and its effects upon another region.
No single catastrophe demonstrates this need more clearly
than the environmental consequences of the Gulf War.
We are witness today to an act of gross environmental
vandalism....
The Iraqi destruction of Kuwait's refineries, storage tanks,
collection networks and oil wells is not a consequence of battle
but the execution of a national policy that threatens the peoples
and environments of the Persian Gulf region. The threat is to bel-
ligerents and non-belligerents alike; the young and old, women
and children suffer equally with those who were locked in combat.
Ironically, the environment of Iraq is threatened least. The pollu-
tion generated by burning the Kuwaiti oil facilities is being trans-
ported across borders, threatening the community of nations to
the south and east. Every day roughly 15,000 tons of smoke are
produced. That smoke is stabilizing in the lower atmosphere and
dispersing across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emir-
ates, Iran, and threatening Pakistan and India. Smoke clouds are
heaviest over Kuwait and remain substantial for a thousand kilo-
meters downwind. Repeated black rain events have occurred over
Kuwait, the Persian Gulf and Iran. . . . Water supplies can be
polluted by soot fallout ... "
[W]e are not having one Chernobyl, we are having many
Chernobyls in Kuwait.15
" Special Conference About the Middle-East, FED. NEWS SEIIV., Mar. 19, 1991
(Statement of Richard Small).




The war resulted in six to eight million barrels of oil being
spilled into the Persian Gulf.16 Damage to oil wells caused 200
pools of oil containing twenty million to thirty million barrels of
oil."7 The cost of the Gulf clean-up has been enormous: "Gulf
environmentalists say Gulf States cannot alone cover cleanup
costs, put by Kuwait at $1.2 billion dollars and Saudi Arabia at
about $900 million dollars."1 8 Other estimates range as high as
$2.8 billion dollars. 9
A scientific team sent to Saudi Arabia by the United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP) "confirmed that 'exten-
sive damage' had been inflicted to some sensitive coastal eco-
systems, including mangroves, fishery breeding grounds and
habitats of endangered species. ' ' 0 Burning oil wells "have
spewed thousands of tonnes of toxic gases into the air and sent a
cloud of black smoke across the northern Gulf into Iran. The
smoke has even blackened the snow on Himalayan peaks."" Al-
though the wells have been capped scientists say that the effects
will linger long after the fires are out."2
A global response entity might have acted with the same
acuity as the massive forces which engaged in Operation Desert
Storm, minimizing the environmental results in the same way
that military victory was pursued.
The 1986 nuclear reactor accident at the Chernobyl facility
in the then Soviet Republic of the Ukraine "caused the first offi-
cially reported radiation deaths in a nuclear power plant acci-
dent and released radioactive material that drifted as far as the
United States.""3 Despite the passage of almost six (6) years
since the Chernobyl accident, its environmental consequences
,o Samia Nakhoul, Curse of Saddam to Haunt Kuwait for Years, Scientists Say,
REUTER LIBR. REP., Nov. 7, 1991.
17 Id.
1 Id.
'9 Mariam Isa, Gulf States Seek 2.8 Billion Dollars to Clean Up Pollution, REUTER
LiBR. REP., Nov. 19, 1991.
20 UN Chron., supra note 4.
' Diana Abdallah, Gulf States Want U.N. Help to Combat Environmental Disas-
ter, REUTERS LIER. REP., Oct. 18, 1991.
22 Id.
20 Developments in the Law - International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1484, 1487 (1991). [hereinafter Developments].
1992]
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continue to mount.14
A global response entity might have been able to mobilize to
contain the release, provide state-of-the-art decontamination
and clean-up, and disseminate warnings and instructions to the
threatened populations.
Coordination and leadership could also be provided for the
clean-up of existing environmental hazards in those jurisdictions
where they remain a low-priority due to economic constraints.
These environmental hazards are typified by Eastern Europe's
recently unveiled grave ecological crises."5
Finally, perhaps the most ominous of the threats which face
the global community is the result not of a singular catastrophe,
but rather of decades of pollution which could cause global
warming. As one of the important consequences, "[t]his could
cause sea level rises over the next 45 years large enough to inun-
date many low-lying coastal cities and river deltas. It could also
drastically upset national and international agricultural produc-
tion and trade systems. '"26
The conclusion which must be drawn from these events and
many others is that the environmental disasters threaten the se-
curity of the international community and that the international
community must therefore respond to such threats on a global
level.
24 According to the director of the Radiobiology Institute of the Byelorussian Acad-
emy of Sciences, "[p]lutonium and other radioactive wastes from the 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear accident. . . continue to threaten the health of a growing number of people who
inhale or ingest them . . . menacing people hundreds of miles from the damaged reactor
... " Thomas W. Lippmann, Chernobyl Contamination Still Spreading, Soviet Says,
WASH. POST, July 5, 1991, at As. Soviet citizens have been attributing many illnesses to
presumed radiation exposure when no such link has been demonstrated, and when it has
been suggested that anxiety and stress were responsible for some reported illnesses. Id.
2' "In Czechoslovakia, 70% of the rivers are polluted; in Poland, half the cities and
35% of industry do not treat sewage and other waste; in eastern Germany, 15,000 haz-
ardous waste sites haven't even been evaluated." Michael Parrish, E. Europe Seeks Way
to Pay Environment Clean-Up Tab, Pollution: Old Soviet Bloc Countries Want U.S.
Techonology to End Contamination. But Can They Afford It?, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1991,
at Al, col. 1.
20 OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 6. "With polar ice melting and oceans warming,
sea levels could rise as much as three feet in a century, inundating coastal lowlands."
ROBERT E. TAYLOR, AHEAD OF THE CURVE: SHAPING NEW SOLUTIONS TO ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS 48 (1990). Compare Taylor's prognosis with the result of a two foot rise in




B. Legal Basis: International Security
Much of the enthusiasm for a GRE arises in consequence of
the actions of the United Nations Security Council in response
to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and from the "hope stirred...
that . . . the United Nations can fulfill its role as the keeper of
international peace and security. '27
That "hope" correlates to mobilization of international
forces to meet all challenges to global security.2 8 The Gulf War
has therefore triggered debate on the need for international re-
sponse to disasters.2 9
"The UN Security Council can make decisions that are
binding on member nations in the furtherance of peace."30 The
principle that the "peace and security" of the international com-
munity is threatened by the interruption of the functioning of
the earth's "natural systems" is embodied in the World Charter
for Nature:
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming the fundamental purposes of the United Nations,
in particular the maintenance of international peace and security,
the development of friendly relations among nations and the
achievement of international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, technical, intellectual or
humanitarian character,
Aware that:
(a) Mankind is a part of nature and life depends on the unin-
terrupted functioning of natural systems which ensure the supply
of energy and nutrients .... 31
" Stephen M. DeLuca, Comment, The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security Under
the United Nations Charter, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 267 (1991).
28 U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1.: "1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action
by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying
out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."
29 Claude Regin, Gulf War Relief Starts Debate on U.N. Emergency Response,
REIUTER LIaR. REP., July 27, 1991.
0 Developments, supra note 21, at 1587.
3' WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE, U.N. Doc. A/37/L4 and Add. 1 (1982), reprinted in
XXI UNITED NATIONS RESOLUtIONs 239 (Djonovich ed. 1986); See also WOLFGANG E.
BURHENNE & WILL A. IRWIN, THE WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
19921
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Just as it was incumbent upon the Security Council to act
in preservation of the "peace and security" of the international
community when Iraq invaded and occupied the sovereign State
of Kuwait, it is incumbent upon that body to mobilize the Mem-
ber States to combat environmental disasters of global
proportions.
This responsibility was reflected in the statement of then
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze at the UN Gen-
eral Assembly:
Political Ecology requires urgent planetary decisions at the
highest political level and an internationalization of national ef-
forts through the United Nations, by consolidating its leading en-
vironmental branch, the appropriate agency of this organization.
And since we are speaking of a major component of international
security, political ecology requires the involvement of the Security
Council in solving problems and activating such tools as trans-
parency and strict international monitoring.2
The realization and assertion by the then Soviet Foreign
Minister that threats to the environment presented the nations
of the world with a security problem, provides the impetus and
the justification for the Security Council to assume responsibil-
ity for global environmental catastrophes.
C. The Nature of a GRE
The following components would be important to an entity
which would respond to major global environmental disasters:"
(1) communications facilities; 4 (2) trained personnel with tech-
AND COMMENTARY, at 9 (1986).
" Schevardnadse - Statement at the UN General Assembly, TASS, Sept. 26,
1989.
" Lynda Chalker, Overseas Development Minister of the United Kingdom, recently
"outlined a three-point Action Plan for Disaster Response ... [which] comprises: Rapid
assessment of the problem; Coordination of relief; [and] deployment of skilled teams and
equipment." Tim Butcher, British Aim to Lead World in Disaster Aid, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH, Aug. 15, 1991.
", This capability is enhanced by improved satellite technology which has improved
global communications. "The role played by modern communications in post-disaster
relief operations is becoming increasingly widespread and sophisticated. Geostationary
meteorological and geosynchronous communications satellite systems from a number of
nations [sic] organisations serve various national and regional needs worldwide." Gerard




nical and scientific expertise;3 5 (3) access to state-of-the-art
clean-up technology and equipment;6  (4) transportation;37  (5)
access to disaster sites;-" and (6) funding for the above.39 The
key to an effective emergency force is "speedy action.
4 0
The need for a rapid response could be fettered by the po-
litical processes necessary for the international community."1
Clear from the requirements for a global response entity is
what this entity is not. This entity does not require a mandate
similar to the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(USEPA), whose framework would likely be imitated in an insti-
tution dealing in general with global environmental protection.' 2
While the framework for an institution for emergency re-
COMM. INT'L, Aug. 1991, at 24.
35 Proposals include the use of a directory of experts and the training of a military-
type force in environmental clean-up techniques. Military personnel and equipment have
been used in environmental disasters such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince Wil-
liam Sound, Alaska. David C. Morrison, Operation Feel Good, 23 NAT'L J., Oct. 26, 1991,
at 2593. The U.S. Coast Guard is an integral part of the U.S. National Response System
as provided for in the U.S. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §1321 () (1990).
3' The capability of response is greatly enhanced by the advances in pollution con-
trol fostered by such "technology forcing" measures as the United States Clean Water
Act and Clean Air Act. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§1251
et seq. (West Supp. 1992), Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§7401 et seq. (West Supp.
1992).
" The possibility exists that military logistics will be available to aid in responding
to global environmental disasters in light of the end of the Cold War. An example of the
effectiveness of military logistics is found in the United States Defense Department's
"Humanitarian Assistance Program" (HAP). In response to the typhoon and flooding
devastating Bangladesh, a U.S. Navy-Marine Corps squadron "tendered water purifica-
tion and reconstruction services and provided food and medicine to the survivors" of the
storm which had taken up to 100,000 lives. Morrison, supra note 35.
"8 This would be one function of a treaty. See OPRC, art. 7, para. 3. Infra text
accompanying note 50.
"o The costs of set-up of the entity are sobering. For example, the cost of state-of-
the-art communications facilities "is viewed as too high for most governments and relief
agencies." O'Dwyer, supra note 34.
"o House of Representatives Select Committee on Hunger, The Decade Disasters:
The United Nations' Response, FED. NEWS SERV., July 31, 1991 (testimony of Andrew S.
Natsios, Dir., Off. of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency For Int'l Dev.).
" In the event of political deliberations in which there was no consensus, in contrast
with the deliberations regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, see DeLuca, supra note 27, at
279, n. 67, the precedent of the Gulf War in mobilizing international resources may prove
meaningless. "During an emergency, however, these deliberative procedures are disas-
trous. UN agencies need to be exempt from these regular administrative procedures dur-
ing emergencies." House of Representatives, supra note 40.
" See Robinson, supra note 7.
1992]
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sponse could exist under the auspices of a "global EPA" which is
based upon the "four principal functions which an institution
must perform in order to cope with such international environ-
mental hazards, '43 the six components listed above are the only
ones necessary to respond to emergent situations.
The high set-up cost of a GRE mandates international
funding cooperation. The Gulf War was accomplished by a com-
mitment from the United States of its overwhelming military
forces. The GRE cannot rely upon the resources of one State for
its funding.44
With the exception of enforcement activities, which such an
entity can initially forego, no governmental basis for a global re-
sponse entity is needed. In essence, to act as does the Interna-
tional Red Cross, a non-governmental organization (NGO), the
entity must be independent.
Humanitarian relief for disasters is provided efficiently and
effectively by such NGOs as the International Red Cross. The
combination of the United Nations and NGOs has become sta-
tus quo in response to humanitarian disasters.45
A component crucial to the effectiveness of the GRE in en-
vironmental disasters is funding. Funds for humanitarian assis-
tance are generally raised case-by-case, based upon appeals to
donors, with a natural priority given to the saving of peoples'
"' 1. The institution must have scientific competence, using the existing scientific
community rather than duplicating its efforts. It is important that scientists con-
trol data collection and define as fully as possible the nature of international envi-
ronmental hazards ....
2. The institution must have some means to gauge the risk which the data reveal.
This is a difficult task, and several tools may be appropriate depending on the
nature of the hazard ....
3. The institution must have means to respond to the hazard proportionate to its
risk ....
4. Finally, the institution must have oversight, monitoring, auditing, and follow-up
capabilities.
Id. at 248-49.
"The United States has heretofore not been put in a position where it would have
an opportunity to aid a victim State in a situation where the United States would have
to confront one of its allies or otherwise act against its own interest." DeLuca, supra
note 27, at 300.
"5 A recent agreement was reached between the Office of the United Nations Disas-
ter Relief Coordinator (UNDRC) and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Socie-
ties to "pool 'expertise and information' for tackling disasters." Disaster Relief Groups




lives before environmental clean-up.
Could a GRE thrive as an NGO with voluntary funding?
The example of the UNEP clearly demonstrates that without
government funding as a start, the entity cannot function with
the effectiveness needed. "Hamstrung by a shortage of personnel
and funds, UNEP simply lacks the resources to tackle such
emerging issues as . . .environmental warfare. 46
While an NGO can be effective in providing medical aid and
food supplies in emergencies, the ability of a volunteer force to
handle an environmental disaster has not been demonstrated. 7
To act in environmental disasters, the GRE therefore must
be more than an NGO. It must be based upon treaties which
allow for initial funding, access to sites, participation in clean-
up, and a liability scheme that will eventually pay for the GRE's
functioning.
The need for a GRE being established and the capability of
the international community to respond to global disasters being
demonstrated, it is clear that the international community must
examine a framework under which such an entity can function.
Part II sets forth several existing models on which an agreement
to empower a GRE can be predicated.
II. INSTITUTIONAL MODELS IN EXISTENCE
The international community has several models in exis-
tence which grapple with the likelihood of environmental disas-
ters. Each of these models attempts to incorporate some of the
aforementioned components necessary for a global response en-
tity ("GRE"). The following are examples of those models:
46 Gray, supra note 12, at 313 (footnote omitted).
'4 The need for an international basis for such an entity is apparent from the state-
ment of a U.S. assistant defense secretary attributing the humanitarian aspects of
"HAP" type efforts as seeking "to reduce or eliminate the causes of dissatisfaction by
assisting our friends ...." Morrison, supra note 35 (emphasis added). This distinction,
based upon political motivations, between "friends" and non-friends, obviates the need
for a non-partisan entity.
19921
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A. International Framework: The International Marine Or-
ganization: International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Co-Operation (OPRC)
The International Marine Organization: International Con-
vention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-Opera-
tion of 1990 (OPRC)' 8 is the most recent international effort to
formulate strategies to cope with environmental disasters which
are beyond the means of a single nation to remedy. The context
of oil spills is an appropriate model for the risks described
above.
Article 6 of the OPRC provides for "Oil Pollution Emer-
gency Plans" which shall require that:
(1) Each party shall establish a national system for responding
promptly and effectively to oil pollution incidents. This system
shall include as a minimum:
(a) the designation of:
(i) the competent national authority or authorities with
responsibility for oil pollution preparedness and
response;
(ii) the national operational contact point or points,
which shall be responsible for the receipt and transmis-
sion of oil pollution reports . . . ;[and]
(iii) an authority which is entitled to act on behalf of
the State to request assistance or to decide to render
the assistance requested;[and]
(b) a national contingency plan for preparedness and re-
sponse which includes the organizational relationship of the
various bodies involved, whether public or private, taking
into account guidelines developed by the Organization."9
This article actually mandates a "national contingency
plan" to manage oil spills and requires a "national operational
contact point" with the authority to act in cases of emergency.
The balance of the OPRC text embodies each of the six
components necessary for a GRE.
"8 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-opera-
tion, Nov. 30, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733 (1991) [hereinafter OPRC].




Article 6(2) discusses one of these, communications:
(2) In addition, each party . .. shall establish: ....
(c) detailed plans and communications capabilities for
responding to an oil pollution incident. Such capabili-
ties should be continuously available .... 50
Article 6 also addresses the training of personnel, the availa-
bility of equipment, and transportation. It mandates a "mini-
mum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment,"
training programs, "detailed plans and communication capabili-
ties for responding to an oil pollution incident" which are to be
"continuously available," and "a mechanism or arrangement to
co-ordinate the response to an oil pollution incident with, if ap-
propriate, the capabilities to mobilize the necessary resources. ' 51
The OPRC also deals with access to the territory of its par-
ties for pollution response activities:
(3) In accordance with applicable international agreements, each
Party shall take necessary legal or administrative measures to
facilitate:
(a)the arrival and utilization in and departure from its terri-
tory of ships, aircraft and other modes of transport engaged
in responding to an oil pollution incident or transporting
personnel, cargoes, materials and equipment required to
deal with such an incident; and
(b)the expeditious movement into, through, and out of its
territory or personnel, cargoes, materials and equipment re-
ferred to in subparagraph (a).52'
The availability of the resources of a state simply for stag-
ing a response operation necessitates an international agreement
to that effect.
The final "component", funding, is handled by taxing the
party responsible for the pollution. The OPRC text accepts as a
"general principal of international environmental law" 53 that the
0 Id.
"' Id. at 739-40.
"2 Article 7, section (3).
" The Statute of the International Court of Justice, 1945, annexed to the Charter of
the United Nations, Article 38, reads: "1. The Court, whose function is to decide in ac-
cordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: ... (c)
1992]
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"polluter pays.""' The simplicity of this principle belies its im-
portance in establishing a potential for a system of funding re-
sponses and remedies by taxing the polluter.
It is noteworthy that OPRC Conference Resolution 101
calls for the development of an "appropriate instrument to ex-
pand the scope of the OPRC Convention to apply, in whole or in
part, to pollution incidents by hazardous substances other than
oil and prepare a proposal to [that] end."56
OPRC therefore contains the framework for. an effective
GRE in an international context. Although currently dealing
only with oil pollution, the OPRC text provides a model for an
international agreement in which the parties agree to a legal ba-
sis for the GRE. Because environmental disasters include those
which are on a more localized scale than a marine oil spill, it is
necessary to study regional arrangements, which could be the
mechanism for the GRE to deal with more localized environ-
mental disasters.
B. Regional Framework: Models Under UNEP
Two of the United Nations Environment Programme's
(UNEP) successes 57 that provide models for study of a regional
framework for a global response entity under the auspices of
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations .... "
" Nations Sign Convention Calling for Renewed Efforts to Protect, Clean Up Bal-
tics, 15 INT'L ENVT'L REP. 223 (April 22, 1992) (Baltic Sea Environmental Declaration
including a policy to "implement the polluter pays principle.") An example of the princi-
ple of "polluter pays" in action is demonstrated in the effectiveness of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) en-
acted in the United States. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq. (West Supp. 1992). With regard to
the disposal of "hazardous wastes", CERCLA provides for joint, several and strict liabil-
ity for:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal . . . owned or operated any facility.
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal .
and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport...
CERCLA §107(a), 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(a).
"' Expansion of the Scope of the International Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 1990, to Include Hazardous and Noxious Sub-
stances, 30 I.L.M. at 760.
" Id. at 761.
87 In light of expectations, UNEP's achievements have been termed remarkable.
Gray, supra note 12, at 297.
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UNEP are the Barcelona Convention on the Mediterranean
Sea,5 8 regarding emergency response to oil and chemical spills,
and the Kuwait Convention on the Persian Gulf."9
1. The Barcelona Convention
The Barcelona Convention adopted a protocol60 which
pledges co-operation in cases of "grave and imminent danger to
the marine environment, the coast or related interests of one or-
more of the Parties . ... 61
The Protocol urges the parties to "maintain and promote
contingency plans." 2 It also encourages information shar-
ing, 3 communications sharing,64 and reporting instructions, 5
and provides for mutual assistance.6 6 However, it essentially
mandates nothing.6
The language of Article 10 of the Protocol is ambivalent:
1. Any party requiring assistance for combating pollution by oil or
other harmful substances polluting or threatening to pollute its
coasts may call for assistance from other - Parties, either di-
rectly or through the regional centre referred to in article 6, start-
ing with the Parties which appear likely to be affected by the pol-
lution. This assistance may comprise, in particular, expert advice
and the - supply to or placing at the disposal of the Party con-
cerned of products, equipment and nautical facilities. Parties so
requested shall use their best endeavours to render this -
assistance.
6 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb.
16, 1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 290 [hereinafter Barcelona Convention].
", Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Pollution, Apr. 24, 1978, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 511 [hereinafter Ku-
wait Convention].
60 "Protocol Concerning Co-Operation In Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean
Sea by Oil and Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency" in 1976, reprinted in
15 I.L.M. 306 [hereinafter Barcelona Protocol].
Id. at art. 1.
6' Barcelona Protocol art. 3, 15 I.L.M. at 307.
6 Barcelona Protocol art. 6, 15 I.L.M. at 307.
Barcelona Protocol art. 7, 15 I.L.M. at 308.
, Barcelona Protocol art. 9, 15 I.L.M. at 309.
66 Barcelona Protocol art. 10, 15 1L.M. at 309.
17 "It is certainly hard to picture the (United States) EPA without authority to can-
cel registrations, deny permits, or seek injunctions." Developments, supra note 21, at
1591.
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2. Where the Parties engaged in an operation to combat - pollu-
tion cannot agree on the organization of the [operation], the re-
gional centre may, with their approval, coordinate the activity of
the facilities put into operation by these Parties. 8
This ambivalence is reflected in the entire Protocol; it man-
dates no assistance, it creates no vehicle to coordinate a re-
sponse, and it mandates no entity to take action in the event of
an emergency.
UNEP has been criticized with regard to the Mediterranean
Sea agreements, which "merely commit the parties to create lia-
bility, compliance and compensation procedures." 9
2. The Kuwait Convention
The Kuwait Convention adopted a protocol 7 0 in 1978 which
had an approach that was more focused on response to emergen-
cies than the Barcelona Convention with the notable addition of
a "Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Centre."
7 1
The Protocol directs contracting states faced with a "marine
emergency situation" to:
(a) take every appropriate measure to combat pollution and/or to
rectify the situation;
(b) immediately inform all other Contracting States, either di-
rectly or through the Centre, of any action which it has taken or
intends to take to combat the pollution. The Centre shall
promptly transmit any such information to all other Contracting
States;
(c) make assessment of the nature and extent of the marine emer-
gency, either directly or with the assistance of the Centre; [and]
(d) determine the necessary and appropriate action to be taken
with respect to the marine emergency, in consultation, where ap-
propriate, with other Contracting States, affected States and the
Centre.7 1
The Protocol further empowers the Centre "[i]n cases of
68 15 I.L.M. at 309.
" Gray, supra note 12, at 306.
70 "Protocol Concerning Regional Co-operation in Combating Pollution by Oil and
Other Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency", reprinted in 17 I.L.M 526 thereinaf-
ter Kuwait Protocol].
" Kuwait Protocol art. III, 17 I.L.M. at 528-30.




special emergencies [not defined], [to] call for the mobilization
of resources made available by the Contracting States to combat
pollution by oil and other harmful substances."73
Nevertheless, the Persian Gulf's "Centre", the Regional Or-
ganization for the Protection of the Marine Environment
(ROPME), has been ineffective in the aftermath of the Gulf
War.74 Thepost-Gulf War ecological crisis is way beyond the
means of a regional organization, even one with such affluent
members as ROPME. ROPME members have sought- interna-
tional aid to handle the crisis.75
Proposals made for the future of ROPME include: (1) en-
hancement of the Marine Emergency Mutual Aid Center; (2) a
regional oil spill contingency plan; (3) a regional agreement for
the transfer of resources for the containment and combating of
spills; (4) a plan of action to address long-term effects of spills
and oil well fires; (5) a technical cooperation committee; and (6)
special efforts devoted to the protection of sensitive habitats and
endangered species. 76
With the exception of ROPME's minimal response to the
results of the Gulf War, no test of the efficacy of a regional con-
vention with regard to a "major" environmental disaster has
been demonstrated. Thus, the Gulf War ecological crisis demon-
strates that international cooperation is necessary to combat
large scale pollution.
The concept of a regional framework demonstrated by both
the Barcelona Convention and the Kuwait Convention has sev-
eral beneficial aspects. The response entity is localized, allowing
for more modest communication and transportation costs. The
personnel can be better trained to handle more localized
problems. Despite its weaknesses, the concept of a regional en-
tity to respond to certain environmental disasters is a viable
71 Kuwait Protocol art. XI, ???5, 17 I.L.M. at 533.
71 "[ROPME] . . . is little more than a paper organization. Its main weakness has
been the sharp political differences among its members, especially former gulf war foes
Iran and Iraq." Nadim Kawash, Environment: Gulf Needs Anti-Pollution Task Force,
INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 15, 1991.
15 ROPME Members, which include Iran, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, have asked for $2.8 billion dollars from the inter-
national community to clean up the pollution in the Persian Gulf. Isa, supra note 19.
76 International Maritime Organization Launches Gulf Oil Pollution Disaster
Fund. INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA), Mar. 5, 1991, at 127.
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one.
7
C. National Framework: The Oil Pollution Act of 199078
In examining the framework for a global response entity, it
is important to view what institutions individual States have es-
tablished to respond to environmental disasters.79
The United States Congress reacted to the enormous envi-
ronmental risks associated with the transport of petroleum prod-
ucts by enacting the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). s0 Congress
declared that:
there should be no discharges of oil or hazardous substances into
or upon the navigable waters of the United States, adjoining
shorelines, or into or upon the waters of the contiguous zone, s" or
in connection with activities under the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act . .. or the Deepwater Port Act. .. or which may af-
fect natural resources belonging to, appertaining to, or under the
exclusive management authority of the United States .... s
The act amends the Clean Water Act and implements a fed-
eral response system as well as an Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
This fund has been established for response actions by the Sec-
retary of Transportation at the direction of the President in the
amount of one billion dollars.8
The response mechanism is set-up under "National Re-
sponse System" and creates a "National Response Unit".84 The
National Response Unit under the auspices of the United States
" The aftermath of the Gulf War resulted in concededly overwhelming environmen-
tal disasters. ROPMEwas designed to deal with smaller-scale problems.
7' 33 U.S.C. §1321, Clean Water Act §311 (West Supp. 1992).
7' This is important as both a "framework" for the establishment of a GRE and for
the contemplated use of national mechanisms in the context of the GRE. See infra Part
IV.
'0 See the legislative history of the act in H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 653 at 146, which lists
three specific incidents: the Exxon Valdez (Prince William Sound, Alaska), the American
Trader (Huntington Beach, California), and the Mega Borg (Gulf of Mexico). Charles
Openchowski, Federal Implementation of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 21 ELR 10605,
Oct. 1991.
81 "ITIhe entire zone established or to be established by the United States under
article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone." 33 U.S.C.
§1321 (a) (9)(C.W.A. §311(a)(9)).
33 U.S.C. §1321(b)(1)(C.W.A. §311(b)(1)).
"Openchowski, supra note 6.





(A) shall compile and maintain a comprehensive computer list of
spill removal resources, personnel, and equipment that is availa-
ble worldwide . ..which shall be available to Federal and State
agencies and the public;
(B) shall provide technical assistance, equipment, and other re-
sources requested by a Federal On-Scene Coordinator;
(C) shall coordinate use of private and public personnel and
equipment to remove a worst case discharge, and to mitigate or
prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge, from a vessel,
offshore facility, or onshore facility . . .;
(D) may provide technical assistance in the preparation of Area
Contingency Plans . . . ; [and]
(E) shall administer Coast Guard strike teams established under
the National Contingency Plan .... 85
The National Response Unit established by the OPA is to
be equipped to handle emergencies in conjunction with the
Coast Guard, which is an established military service that is
well-equipped and trained in the handling of exigent operations
at sea. The potent combination of an existing military organiza-
tion with a mandate to respond to environmental disasters, is
the most desirable framework for a global response institution.
III. CONCLUSION: PROPOSAL FOR THE GRE
The apparent success of the U.N. Security Council in prose-
cuting the Gulf War against Iraq has propelled the Council into
an unprecedented international position of power."'
In this climate, the U.N. Security Council could deal effec-
tively with disasters as the body responsible for the GRE.87 As
" Id. at sub para. (j)(2).
8 "In view of the cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union [or
successor Commonwealth] in the post-cold war era, the Security Council has a better
chance of fulfilling its role as the body of the United Nations charged with the primary
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security." DeLuca, supra note 27,
at 268 (footnotes omitted).
8' "The Soviet Union wants problems of environmental security to be discussed at
the level of the Security Council, the United Nations' only body with the authority to
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the "environmental tool" of the Security Council, the GRE
could act with the authority of the Security Council. While par-
ticipation in the GRE would be voluntary8 and based primarily
on the request of a sovereign state to assist in the clean-up of an
environmental problem, an environmental disaster which
crossed boundaries and threatened the environment of a Mem-
ber State could be redressed by the Security Council in the same
fashion as a military invasion. 89 The only difference would be
the response action, performed by the GRE, and the purpose of
that action would be rectifying the environmental problem,
rather than opposing military force.
For environmental disasters, the response to the Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait presents a model for cooperation, coordination
and action. The importance of a rapid response is well-noted
and efforts must be made to streamline communications and
procedures to facilitate a remedy at a time when the costs may
be minimized. In light of its unique mandate, and as the "envi-
ronmental tool" of the Security Council, the GRE should be in-
dependent of UNEP.90
The actions of the GRE should indeed resemble the armed
take [sic] decisions binding for States." Schevardnadse, supra note 8, at 23.
'0 "Theoretically, customary international law could reduce the problems hold-outs
cause by creating rights and obligations for states that do not join the agreement." De-
velopments, supra note 22, at 1537 (footnotes omitted).
" "In this connection, measures and procedures intended for military use could be
combined with environmental control. This would make it possible to use simply and
rationally the results of States' concerted efforts to save the planet from destruction."
Schevardnadse, supra note 8, at 23.
90 UNEP suffers from a difficulty faced by many international agencies. "UNEP,
more promotional than operational, brings parties together and suggests programs, but
does not always push them through to completion. Innovative and potentially efficacious
initiatives, like the authority granted the Director to issue international alerts regarding
global environmental threats, lie dormant." Gray, supra note 12, at 307-08 (footnotes
omitted). The very nature of an emergency response entity is one of operation. Proposals
do exist to enhance the authority of UNEP. These include, with regard to UNEP's
"authority":
primacy among international organizations in all environmental matters of global
or regional significance . . . . [I]deally, UNEP would have the authority to de-
clare, promulgate, and enforce principles of international environmental law. Pos-
sibly through a sub-body with Security Council-like powers to prosecute in the
International Court of Justice, UNEP could apply sanctions, and even dispatch
,environmental police' . . .
Id. at 317. This scheme would turn UNEP into an entity closely resembling the United
State Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA).
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol4/iss1/9
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response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait: The gravity of the prob-
lem demands it. The GRE would act as coordinator of opera-
tions, marshaling resources from Member States and dispatch-
ing response teams under the flag of the United Nations much
as the U.N. peace-keeping forces now operate.
. The GRE would handle the day-to-day operations, includ-
ing the "ordinary" environmental disaster (those which do not
pose a political question or require resources greater than cur-
rently available from the GRE). The sensitive political issues
would be handled directly by the Security Council.
Each Member State and organization will initially put cer-
tain specific resources at the disposal of the GRE for use in case
of environmental disaster. These resources should include: (a)
communications facilities;9' (b) personnel;9" (c) training facili-
ties; (d) specialized clean-up equipment; (e) transportation; and
(f) scientific facilities. These resources will be maintained on a
"ready to go" status, able to be summoned as needed. The GRE
will catalogue and update the resources, including any provided
and funded by the GRE itself.93
To aid in the recovery of response costs, each member State
shall enact appropriate "polluter pays" measures. Liability for
response costs, as mandated by both the Treaty enabling the
GRE and the individual States' measures should be strict, joint
and several, and allow for the recovery of costs and attorney's
fees. Private polluters should be prosecuted, on behalf of the
GRE,9' by the Member State's environmental organization (e.g.,
USEPA), and State polluters should submit to jurisdiction
before the International Court of Justice or an International En-
9' One key to the structure of an effective GRE is information processing and com-
munications ability. The Soviets have proposed the launch of an international space lab-
oratory or a manned orbiting station designed to monitor the state of the environment.
Environment: Center for Urgent Assistance Being Considered, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov.
1, 1989. The information collected could then be dispersed to regional response centers
and national environmental agencies through the GRE central facility.
" The same mechanism as is used in assembling a peace-keeping force can be used.
" The enormous expense of an adequate communications network, as well as state-
of-the-art monitoring equipment, coupled with equipment to be maintained in readiness
for a response action, requires the initial funding to be made on a global level by Mem-
ber States.
Legislative enactments in Member States should include provisions which give
the GRE standing to sue in that State's courts.
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vironmental Court. 5 All recoveries should be applied directly to
the GRE for response actions.
As its legal basis the GRE should rely on a treaty similar to
OPRC, which would involve the environmental protection orga-
nizations (e.g., USEPA) of each U.N. Member State. Similarly
the GRE should incorporate regional entities (e.g., ROPME)
into administrative regions for the purpose of managing local-
ized problems.9 National and regional environmental entities
are the mechanisms for: (a) the request of assistance to the GRE
during the advent of an environmental disaster in their jurisdic-
tion; (b) access to the jurisdiction for GRE response operations;
and (c) advocacy of the GRE's claims in the eventual attempt to
recover the response costs from the entity responsible for the
environmental disaster.
The national and regional environmental organizations will
also be available to provide assistance during an environmental
disaster, in providing pledged resources and technical expertise,
as needed.
The result of the establishment of a GRE should be the ex-
istence of an institution which coordinates and manages re-
sponses to environmental disasters in an aggressive and compe-
tent manner. If such an institution were empowered by the U.N.
Security Council, the potent combination of military prowess
and environmental protection might be realized.
" See, e.g., The Honorable Amadeo Postigione, A More Efficient International Law
on the Environment and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment
within the United Nations, 20 ENVT'L L. 321 (1990).
" The regional centers would inventory the clean-up and rescue resources at their
disposal and coordinate response actions with the regional states. Through this means a
regional entity such as ROPME could act as the response entity for emergencies local-
ized in that region.
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